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THE POLICY, LAW, AND FACTS OF
COPYRIGHTING COMPUTER SCREEN
DISPLAYS: AN ESSAY
by LT. HARDY·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Commentators in both the academic l and popular2 press frequently
debate the issue of whether the "look and feel" of a computer pro• Associate Professor of Law. College of William & Mary. Williamsburg. Virginia.
1. See. e.g.• Bendekgey. Copyright Protection for Computer Software Visual Displal/s.' Protecting a Program's Look and Feel. 6 SoFTWARE PROTECTION 1 (1988); Bixby.

SlI'Ithesis and Originality in Computer Screen Displays and User Interfaces: The "Look
OM Feel " Cases. 27 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 31 (1991); Friedman. Copyrighting Machine Langwage Computer Software-The Case Against. 9 CoMPUTER/L.J. 1 (1989); Hazen. Contract
Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software:
The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works. and the
Proper Limits of Licensing Agreements. 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 105 (1986); Menell. An
AnalJlSi& of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs. 41 STAN. L. REv.
100 (1989); Mueller• .Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer/User
Inter/aces. 9 CoMPUTER/L.J. 37 (1989); Stern. Legal Protection of Screen Displays and
Other User Interfaces for Computers: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for Crention
A90inst Need for Free Access to the Utilitarian. 14 COLUMBIA-VLA J . L. & ARTS 283
(1990); Note. The Copyrightability of Computer Program Screen Displays. 10 COMMJENT
859 (1988); Note. Copyrighting ''Look and Feel": Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, 3
HARv. J .L. & TEcH. 195 (1990); Note. Dfifi,ning the Scope of Copyright Protection for Com""'~ Software. 38 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1986); Note, Brenking the Mold: Forging a New and
Comprehensive Standard of Protection for Computer Software, 8 CoMPUTER/L.J. 389. 447
(1988); Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Software After Whelan Associates v.
J",,/OW Dental Laboratory. 54 Mo. L. REV. 121 (1989); Note, Screen Displays Are Proper
Std1;;ect Matter for Copyright Protection. 1988 UNlV. ILl- L.J. 757; Note, When Technology
OM the Law Collide-Look and Feel Copyright Evolves. 16 WEST. ST. UNIV. L . REV. 183
(1988) .

2. Burke, Xeroa; Joins Technology-Licensing Fray; Campaign Centers on "Look and
Feel" of Graphical User Interfaces, PC WEEK, May 29, 1989, at 69; Cocoran, Look But
Don't Touch: Software Companies Battle Over Intellectual Property Rights, SCI. AM.,
Sept., 1989. at 101; Jerome, "Power to Programmers," Picketers Tell Lotus; Protest Over
Look-oM-Feel LawllUits, PC-COMPUTING. Sept.• 1989, at 43; Samuelson, Why the Look and
Feel of Software User Interfaces Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law, COM. ACM,
May,1989, at 563; Veronis. Pirates Walk the Plank in Look and Feel Case. BOSTON Bus. J .,
Mar. 13, 1989, at 1.
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gram-how it appears to the human user of the program---can be the
subject of copyright protection. The debate will surely be fueled by recent court decisions dealing with the copyright protection of various elements of a screen display.3
As applied particularly to the visual displays of a program seen by a
user on the computer's screen, this debate is unnecessary: the screen
displays of computer programs are clearly and unquestionably the
proper subject of copyright protection. Judicial resolution of the issue
has never been necessary or desirable. The root of judicial and scholarly misconception about copyright's application to screen displays,
namely that there is anything to debate at all, has been a failure to separate the distinct questions of policy, law, and fact that govern any
copyright inquiry.
Whether the screen displays of a computer program are copyrightable is a question of law involving copyright's subject matter; the answer turns on an interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act and its
legislative history. Whether these displays should be copyrightable is a
question of copyright policy; the answer to that question turns on the
economics of the copyright incentive and an assessment of public
benefits.
Whether a particular computer program's screen displays can be
copyrighted turns on the tests of copyright protection, namely originality and fixation, and is highly fact dependent. Whether a given program's displays are in/ringed by another program's is similarly a fact
dependent question that turns on a comparison of the two programs.

II.

SUBJECT MA TIER OF PATENTS AND THE
COPYRIGHT ANALOGY

A distinction between policy and law is obvious, but the distinctions
among copyright subject matter, tests, and infringement may not be so
obvious. These distinctions are clearer in patent law, which offers an
informative parallel.
To be patented, an invention must fit one of the categories of patentable "subject matter": it must be either a machine, an article of
manufacture, a composition of matter, or a process. 4 The invention
3. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 26,903,
1992 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 5986 (April 14, 1992) (denying infringement of various elements of
the Apple Macintosh screen displays by the Microsoft Windows program ); Brown Bag
Software v. Symantec Corp., 22 U.S.P .Q.2d (BNA) 1429, Copy. L . Rep . (CCH ) ~ 26,896, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 6154 (April 7, 1992) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff
claiming copyright infringement in the screen displays of an "outlining program); Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D . Mass. 1990) (finding
infringement of the "menu" of commands ne<:essary to operate the Lotus 1-2-3 program ).
4. 35 U.S.C . § 101.
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must also meet a separate set of "tests" of patentability: novelty, utility,
and non-obviousness. 5 A telephone, for example, is appropriate subject
matter for a patent because it is an "article of manufacture" (or a
machine). So is a carburetor or a laser. The chemical compound known
as nylon also fits within patentable subject matter, as does any distinct
chemical compound, because it is a "composition of matter."
Despite being clearly within the category of patentable subject matter, however, none of the things just listed could actually receive a patent today because they all fail to pass one or more tests of patentability.
Telephones, carburetors, lasers, and nylon all fail to meet the test of
"novelty": they have been invented already and are no longer new. A
brand new chemical compound with unknown properties would meet
the "novelty" test, but would fail to meet the "utility" test: if it had no
known use, it could not be "useful" and could not for that reason receive a patent. 6
The key point about patent law is that to receive protection, an invention must meet both the general "subject matter" requirement and
also satisfy the particular "test" requirements.
Copyright law operates similarly. Although there is some confusion over this point,7 copyright's "subject matter" is works of author5. Id. §§ 101. 102, 103.
6. See Brenner v. Manson. 383 U.S. 519. 528-36 (1965).
7. The Copyright Act seems to define subject matter as a concept that encompasses
as one the concepts that I separate: subject matter and tests. The Act says. under the
heading "The Subject Matter of Copyright," that "Copyright protection subsists ... in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... from which
they can be perceived. reproduced. or otherwise communicated." 17 U .S.C. § 102. By including all three concepts in one undifferentiated section. the Act's text implies that subject matter, originality. and fixation constitute a unitary concept.
The House Report on the Copyright Act is more ambiguous. The Report first indicates that "subject matter" is not a unitary concept, but rather has two separate components. originality and fixation: it discusses the "General subject matter of copyright"
under those two headings: "Original works of authorship" and "Fixation in tangible
form. " H.R. REP. No. 94-1476. at 51. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U .S. CODE CONGo & A DMIN. NEWS 5659-61 (he reinafter House Report). Yet the Report goes on to identify subject
matter with originality. but not with fixation. when it notes that the "phrase ... original
works of authorship .. . characteriz[es) the general subject matter of statutory copyright
protection." Id. at 51. This wording suggests that subject matter and originality constitute
a unitary concept. different from the requirement of fixation .
If that were not enough. the Report begins the discussion of originality by referring
to "[t)he two fundamental criteria of copyright protection" as being originality and fixation, without referring to the concept of subject matter of " work. " thereby suggesting that
the subject matter question is separate from the tests ("criteria") of originality and fixation as I argue. ld. at 51 (emph asis added).
This notion is confirmed in the discussion of section 301. the preemption provision.
where the Report explicitly distinguishes copyright's "subject matter" from the originality
requirement: "As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories
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ship.S Copyright's "test" are originality and funtion in a tangible
medium. 9
The subject matter question applies to whole categories of things.
"Novels," for example, fall into the category of "literary works" and for
that reason one can say unequivocally that as literary works, novels are
copyrightable subject matter. Whether a category of "things" falls
within the subject matter of copyright is a legal determination because
it requires an answer to a legal question: are the things "works of
authorship?"
In contrast to the subject matter requirement, the tests of originality and fixation can only be assessed in regard to particular works of authorship. That is, they are primarily questions of fact, turning on the
amount of originality and the degree of fixation of a given work. In
practice, they are not difficult. "Originality" means no more than that a
given work has not been copied. 10 Fixation means merely that a work
be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration."ll Though it raises some theoretical questions,12 the requirement of fixation seldom raises any serious questions in real cases.
Though "novels" are within the subject matter of copyright, for example, a given novel that is simply copied from someone else cannot be
copyrighted by the copier because it fails to meet the test of "originality." Likewise, a novel that exists only in the mind of its author-no
of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if . .. it is too
minimal or lacking in originality to qualify" for copyright protection. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). In other words, the Report here allows for the fact that a work may be a part
of copyright's subject matter, but not be "original," clearly implying that the two concepts
are distinct. The Act and the HOtUJe Report are not, in short, models of clarity on the
question of the differences between "subject matter," "originality," and "fixation."
I offer my own rationalization-that "subject matter" and the "tests" of protection,
originality and fixation, are distinct-as preferable to the confusion reflected in the Act
and its Report. Doing so greatly clarifies my argument, but is not essential to my
conclusions.
8. The Act does not define "works of authorship," Bee House Report, at 51 (''The
phrase 'original works of authorship' ... is purposely left undefined."), but illustrates the
concept with a list that includes literary works; musical works; dramatic works;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
picture and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
9. "Originality" means that a work must have originated with the author. "Fixation" means that the work must be sufficiently recorded in some medium that it can be
reproduced.
10. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903); Durham
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F .2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V.
Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Alfred
Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
12. Is a poem written in the sand of a beach for a moment "fixed?"
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matter that the author can recite it word for word-cannot be copyrighted because it fails the test of fixation in a tangible medium, though
it clearly meets the subject matter requirement.
The essential infringement question is whether the defendant exercised one or more of the rights granted exclusively to the plaintiff copyright owner. In practice, look-and-feel cases have invoked the two most
common copyright rights: the right to reproduce and the right to distribute to the public the copyrighted work of authorship. Typically,
then, screen display infringement comes down to a question of whether
one display copied "too much" from another display. Like the issues of
originality and fixation, this issue is largely one of fact; it can only be
assessed in the context of two particular works, compared side by side.
Copyright litigation potentially raises all four issues: first, does the
plaintiff's work fit into one of the categories of copyrightable subject
matter? Second, if the answer to this question is uncertain, then as a
matter of copyright policy, should the plaintiff's work fall under copyright's protection? Third, does the plaintiff's work meet the tests of
copyright protection- originality and fixation? And finally, does the
defendant's use of a work infringe any of the plaintiff's copyright
rights?
It is crucial that courts address these questions in the order shown.
The first question is whether the "thing" in issue in litigation falls
within copyright's subject matter. If the statute is clear on this point,
there is no warrant for undertaking a policy analysis. When Congress
has decided, for example, that "literary works" are appropriate for
copyright's subject matter, Congress has foreclosed courts from reconsidering this same question de novo in regard to something that is
unarguably a "literary work."
This result seems so plainly dictated by notions of separation of
powers and the need for predictability in the application of statutes that
one can hardly argue the contrary. Only when a "thing" is not clearly
within or without copyright's subject matter should a court address policy concerns to make its determination. is
For litigation over screen displays, then, the questions are first, do
screen displays fall within the subject matter of the Copyright Act?
Second, if that question is not clear. is it advisable that they do so?
Third, do the screen displays of a given computer program meet the requirements of originality and fixation? And finally, are the screen displays of a given program so substantially copied that the copies infringe
the rights of the original program's copyright owner?
The rest of this article will show that even a casual reading of the
13. Policy arguments are also appropriately made, of course, to Congress itself to
change a statute whose application is clear but perhaps inadvisable.
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Copyright Act answers the first of these questions affirmatively: screen
displays clearly fall within copyright's subject matter. Policy argume nts
about displays are therefore inappropriate for judicial consideration.

Even as made to Congress. however. the usual policy arguments against
including screen displays within copyright's subject matter are badly
flawed; they do not stack up against the strong arguments for including
screen displays within copyright's protection.

A.

Issue 1: Do Screen Displays Fall Within Copyright 's Subject
Matter?

Whether computer screen displays fall within copyright's subject
matter is easily answered: 0/ course they do. They are either " pictorial
or graphic" works. or they are "audiovisual works," both of which categories of copyrightable subject matter are explicitly listed in the Copyright Act.Jot
Courts easily reached this conclusion for the displays of video
games, IS perhaps because of their similarity to movies. But the same
conclusion follows for the copyrightability of ordinary application pro.
grams like word processors and spread sheets. The legislative history of
the Act shows why the conclusion is compelled. The previous Copyright Act, enacted in 1909, accorded protection to an ambiguous mixture
of intangible works and tangible media. The general subject matter was
"the writings of an author."18 Writings were classified for registration
purposes as including not only "books ... photographs . .. [and] prints,"
but also "periodicals . .. lectures, sermons ... works of art ... [and]
dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions."17 The first group suggests tangible objects: books, photographs, and prints are different nu'di a . But the second group, "periodicals, lectures, sermons ... works of
art .. . [and] dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions," consists of
intangible " works," which can be embodied in any medium.
Congress eventually became dissatisfied with this mixing of tangible and intangible concepts into one category.18 The principal drawback
was that by emphasizing the application of copyright t o the known media of expression in 1909, the old Act could not easily be applied to new
technological developments. which commonly take th e form of new
14. 17 U.S .c. § 102.
15. ~, ~. g. , M . Kramer Mfg. Co. v. A ndrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986): Atari
v. North Am . P hilips Consumer El ecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (1 th C ir.), ~t. denitd, 4~
U.S. 880 (1 982): S te m E lecs. v . Kaufm a n, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982): Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Dirkschneider, ~3 F. S upp. 466. 479 (0. Neb. 1981).
16. 1909 Copyright Act, Act of March 4, 1909, ch . 320, 35 Stat. 1075, § 4.
17. Jd. § 5.
18. HolUI! R eport, &upro note 7, at 51.
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means of expression-new technological media. 19
Congress reacted to cases such as VYhite-Smith Publishing Co. v.
Apollo,20 which had found that musical works embodied in the medium
of player piano rolls could n ot be copyrighted because they could not be
read directly by humans. After Mite-Smith's emphasis on the medium
as t he critical copyrightable entity. musical works in non-human readable form were widely copied and sold. 21 Congress was dissatisfied with
this outcome and determined for the 1976 Act "to avoid the artificial
and largely unjustifiable distinctions" drawn in U'hite-Smith on the basis of medium, rather than "work."22 Congress in 1976 deliberately
turned away from this ambiguous focus to write a statute whose subject
matter consisted not of known types of media, but on the contrary of
intangible "works," which could be embodied in any medium " now
known or later developed."23
To be sure, copyright protection would not be complete until a particular work met the test of embodiment or "fixation " in some type of
medium, but the 1976 Act's 8Ubject matter requirement was left "mediumless." The explicit goal of this approach was to allow for new tech·
nological means of expression to arise and embody works that would
receive copyright protection without the necessity of amendments to
the statute.24 Plainly, then, if something is considered a "work of authorship" under the 1976 Act, it is within the subject matter of copyright without regard to whether it is embodied in the pages of a book,
the tracks of a laser disk, or on a computer display.
One can hardly argue that an author who writes a novel at a com19. The history of copyright law hu been one of gradual expansion in the types
of worM accorded p rotection , and the subject matter affected by this e xpansion
has fallen into two general categori • . In the fint, lcientific discoverie5 and tech·
nological developmentl have made paulble new fomu of crefltive expression that
never existed before. In some of these cases the new exp reuive forms- . .. com p uter programs, for example----eould be regarded as an e xtemion of copyrigh table
subject matter. Congreu had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the oulaet without the need of new legislation.

20. 2Q9 U.S. 1 (1908).
21 . Houu R~. ,upm note 7, at 21.
22. TeL.t .52.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102. S«: ol#o HoUM: R~, .rupTa note 7, . t 52 ("it makes no differe nce what the form, manner, o r medium of fixation may be--whether it is in words, numben, notes, sounlh, pictures, or other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a
physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculp tural, punched, magnetic, or any
other s lable form ...."). The HoWH! &pt;>rl notes that the de finitions in section 101 "re_
flect a /und.:lmen to l dutinction between the 'original work' wh ich is the product of 'authonhip' and the multitude o f material objecu in which it can be embodied. Thus ... a
'book' is not a work of authorship . .. " but rather a "litera ry work." TeL at .53 (em phasiJ;
added ).
24 . S«: supra note 23.

378

COMPUTERILAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

puter keyboard has failed to create a work within the subject matter of
copyright. Similarly, the artist who creates a drawing on a computer
has without question created a work of authorship. a "pictorial work,"
that is within the subject matter of copyright. It is equally clear that a
company that puts together a series of graphic images. amounts of text,
animations, etc., for expression on a computer display, has created a
"work Q/. authorship," either as a literary work. as individual pictorial
works, as a "collective work" of individual works. or as a single "audiovisual" work much akin to a movie. Each of these things is explicitly
listed in the Act as an illustration of copyrightable subject matter ,25
There can be no other conclusion. in short, but that computer
screen displays are pictorial, graphic, or audio visual displays, and hence
fall within the subject matter of the copyright law. The text of the stat~
ute is perfectly clear on this point, and is confirmed by the legislative
history, so that a resort to policy analysis is not called for. 26

B.

IBSUe 2: Should Screen. Displays Fall Within Copyright's Subject
Matter?

Nonetheless, because commentators so often raise policy objections
to including screen displays within copyright's subject matter, these policy arguments may eventually reach the ears of Congress, where they
are appropriately raised. They therefore merit consideration.
The usually offered policy grounds for excluding displays from protection fall into four types: (1) the argument of cost savings; (2) the argument of compatibility and standards; (3) the argument of progress;
and (4) the argument of functionality. None of them is persuasive.
III.

THE COST SAVINGS ARGUMENT

The argument of cost savings is that protection of screen displays
forces other companies, who have not authored a given screen display,
to spend time and money developing new ones if they cannot copy from
existing ones.
Stating the argument this way should show immediately why
standing alone, it is no argument at all: it proves far too much. If we
are to allow copiers free access to works on the grounds that doing so
will save money, we need not stop with screen displays. Society can
26. &e 17 U.S.C. § 102.
26. The rut" of ....tutory construction provide that when a statute's meaning Is dear
and the legislative history supporta that meaning, courta should not turn to a policy analysis to interpret It. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.s. 886, 895-96 (1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 7--8 (1980). Indeed, a judidal willingness to entertain policy arguments when a statute is obvious renders future statutes, equally obvious, uncertain, and thereby Invites unnecessary litigation.
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save even more money by letting copiers copy the latest novels or popular posters or advertisements or photographs or poetry or record albums
or anything else. Copying is always cheaper than creating.
But the affirmative reason we have a copyright law is not to minimize the cost of re-creation; rather it is to provide an incentive for creation in the first place. Without the copyright incentive, would-be
creators would be reluctant to invest in creative activity; instead of
cheaper works. society would have too few. In any event, the argument
of cost saving is one that could be made for hundreds of creative endeavors; but it is one that neither Congress nor the courts should accept, precisely because it undermines the very incentives that copyright
law exists to foster.
IV.

NEED-FOR-COMPATIBILITY-THROUGH-STANDARDS ARGUMENT

The argument about compatibility is similar to the cost savings argument, but is couched in terms of benefitting the public instead of benefitting the would-be copier. The argument is that making new
programs "compatible" with accepted standards benefits consumers by
reducing the time required for users to become familiar with the operation of the new program. Typical of this argument is the assertion by
one commentator that not considering the value of standards in a copyright case "is to condone or even prescribe making it harder and more
exasperating for the public to use software. and therefore to slow the
growth of the software market."n
Three points need to made here. First. compatibility means several
different things. most of which do not raise questions about screen display copyrights at all; second. standardization is a benefit. but neither
courts nor Congress are well-placed to determine what degree and timing for standards is optimal; and third, the public can benefit from compatibility and standards without courts or Congress denying copyright
protection for screen displays.

A. What Does "Compatibility" Mean?
Software can be compatible with other software in any of several
ways: it can run "under" another software package; it can run as an
"add-in" to another software package; it can use data in the same format as that used by another package; or it can run "instead of" another
27. Stem, ~pra note 1, at 311. See abo Leeke, Sqjtware Copvri.ght Court Ruling
Stin Debau, PC WEEK, Dee. 9, 1986, at 59, 68. ~ted in Note. 10 COMMIENT 859, 862 n.14,
"'pro note 1 (arguing that allowing a monopoly in the screen displays originated by one
company "might dangeroualy inhibit lOme good trendll in our industry-the natural development of standards and the ability of people to take advanu.ge of compatibility to sell
new products that do new t.hinp..").
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software package. The first three are perfectly compatible with copyright law; the fourth is not.

Some programs control the operation of other programs. These
programs are referred to as "operating systems" or "operating environments." Typical of these kinds of programs are the Microsoft Corporation's MS-DOS and Windows, the Apple Corporation's Macintosh
Finder, the Quarterdeck Corporation's DesqView, the Digital Research
Corporation's DR-DOS and GEM, and others.
Operating system programs are conventionally spoken of as running other programs "under" them. One speaks of a program like the
Aldus Corporation's "Pagemaker" as running "under" Microsoft Windows, or "Word for the Macintosh" as running "under" the Macintosh
Finder operating system.
Other programs run in a sense "along side of" or ''with'' a given
program. These programs are often referred to as "add-ins" because
they add new features to another program, operating more or less as if
they were a part of the latter program. Many companies make programs that cooperate with Lotus 1-2-3, for example, to add features not
provided by 1-2-3. Versions of WordPerfect before 5.1, for another example, did not provide support for a "mouse" pointing device; several
companies made products that grafted support for using a "mouse" onto
that popular word processor.
None of these examples of programs that run "under" or "along
side of" other programs constitutes copyright infringement. In the case
of the programs that run under an operating system like Windows or
the Macintosh or GEM, to the extent that such programs could be said
to reproduce the operating system's screen display, permission is wholeheartedly extended by the operating system company. Third party
software development is precisely the reason such systems are created
in the first place. Apple has never, to my knowledge, contemplated
suing third parties who create programs to run on the Macintosh.
Neither has Microsoft sued anyone for selling Windows programs, or
for that matter, programs that run under DOS.
In the case of programs that run as add-ins to an underlying program, infringement is also not a problem because these add-ins do not
reproduce the underlying display. They may use it, they may take advantage of it, they may work with it, but they do not make a copy of it
or perform it or distribute it or do any other infringing activities. They
no more infringe the underlying program than a plastic dust jacket or
book mark infringe the novel they are used with.28
Compatibility is also widely achieved through reliance on common
28. In fact, l uperior add·In technologie. may end up being licenud and distributed by
the originating company. Lotus liceIllH!d " Impress," an add-In to Lotus 1·2-3 that en·
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data file formats. Many database products can read and write data files
that are stored in the particular format that the market leading "dBase"
program stores them. Many spreadsheet programs can read and write
Lotus 1-2-3 formatted data fUes.
This type of data compatibility is common and is not prevented by
copyright law29 for very good reasons. A company needs to know that it
can protect a screen display so that it can determine how much of its
resources to invest in display design,so One can spend next to nothing

or a fortune or anything in between on screen display design. But a
data format offers far fewer options, so that the range of investment
levels is quite narrow. A program has to have some kind of data format, and users rarely care exactly what that format is. There is thus no
need for the incentive of copyright law to protect data format designs.
Companies have all the incentive they need from the sheer necessity of
selling their software product.31
The fourth type of "compatibility" refers to something altogether
different: some programs are sold as compatible with the screen display
of another program because they are intended to be used instead 0/ the
original program. This is the category of "clone" software.32 The Mt>
saie company's "Twin" program, for example, duplicated the features of
Lotus 1-2-3; the Softklone company's "Mirror" program at one time duplicated the screen display of Digital Communication Associates'
"Crosstalk" communications program. Parts of the Windows and GEM
screen displays may have duplicated some of the Macintosh display.
Clone software potentially does infringe the copyright on an original program's screen displays. Cloning's principal justification is that it
reduces training time," Of course it reduces training time if users already have training on the original program. It reduces other costs as
well: scores of training manuals, books, templates, courses, etc. exist for
Lotus 1-2-3. A clone program that has exactly the same functions and
screen display as Lotus can "piggy back" on these materials at no cost.
hances spn!adsheet display and printing quality, from an independent software developer.
S« PC MAG., July 19!Ml, at 54.
29. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univenity Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 101214 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (data (ormata can be copied either because they are unprotectlble
"Ideas" or because the format's "expression" has merged with Ita ''idea'' and Is therefore
not copyrightable); accord Plains Cotton Co-op Aa'n v. Goodpasture Computer Se~., 807
F.2d 1256, l262 (5th Cir.), cert. cknW, 484 U.s. 821 (1987).
30. For a brief discussion of copyright'. role in channelling investments, see 1 P.
GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT §§ 1.2.3.1-1.2.3.2, at 16-20 (1989).
31. 'I'hla Is obviously a policy argument and would not be necessary if the Copyright
Act weN! clear about protecting formata.
32. And arguably this category includes Microloft Windows, which Is sold to a large
extent 81 an alternative to the Apple Maeinta-h.
33. S« MeneU,.upro note 1, at 109:i.
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Compatibility, when it means saving on training time, training
manuals, the production of templates, etc. is n onetheless not a good rea·
son to allow copying: this is just the "cost savings" arguments allover
again and no better justified merely because it appears under a more
public spirited label.
Nor is compatibility a good justification when couched in terms of
"network externalities." An "externality" generally is a cost or benefit
borne involuntarily, and not felt through a market's price mechanism .34
The concept of "network externalities" refers to the fact that for some
products and services, existing users derive a benefit not only from
their own use of the product, but also from the number of other users
of the product. 35 The best example, and one from which the term " net·
work" evidently derives,36 is the telephone network. Each telephone
subscriber enjoys increasing communication benefits as the number of
other subscribers to the same network reachable by phone grows larger.
Because the benefits of an increasing number of subscribers accrue
to existing phone users without their paying for it or without their hav·
ing a choice about it, the benefits to existing users are "external," i.e.,
not felt through the normal market for buying and selling phone ser·
vice. New users are only willing to pay for the number of other users
already on the same network at the time. They will take account, in
other words, only of the benefits they receive from joining the network;
they will not take account of (and will n ot be w ill ing to pay for ) the
"external" benefits they confer on existing users. Because those benefits are real to society, the argument goes, some form of subsidy is nec·
essary to "lure" growing numbers of users to join the n etwork.
Applied to screen displays, the argument for standardization is that
additional users for a given display bring " network" benefits to existing
users by adding to the number of training materials, templates, etc. 31
Because it is difficult to subsidize new users of a program's screen dis·
plays directly, an indirect subsidy can be obtained by allowing other
firms to copy an originating firm 's screen displays.38 The lower cost of
the copied displays is in effect the subsidy.
3<4. 5« R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LA w ... NO EcoNOMICS 4 ~6 ( 988 ).
35. See generally the economic analysis in Kal:t & Shapiro, Ndwork EZlV1Ialitiu.
Com~tition. and Compatibility, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 424 (1985).
36. The term a ppear. to have bee n lint uaed in Kat:t & Sh apiro, supra note 35.
37. 5« Menell, supra note 1 at 1066-71; 1095-98 (1 989 ) (diacussing the extemalitiea N '
lOciated with standard user-computer interfaces); Menell. Tailoring lAr1a1 Protection fo r
Compu~ SoftwG", 39 STAN. L. R EV. 13229, 13<40-45, 1357-63 (987) (diSCUQing the po$itive
externalities associated with "operating s}':Ite m " software ).
38. O r more generally by reducing the scope of screen display protection. Menell argues, for e xample, that a non-standard IlCreen disp lay should receive copyright protection,
but that the protection be forfeited if the display becomes a de facto s tandard. 5« MenelJ,
supra note 1 at 1098. 1102.
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Though superficially attractive as a rationale for allowing diminished protection for screen displays. the "network externalities" argument fails. The argument as applied to screen displays is no different
from saying that economies of scale can lower costs. If all food shoppers, for example, could be required to shop at two or three grocery

stores instead of several, the chosen (standard) stores could grow in size
and achieve economies of scale enabling them to lower prices. That is
not a sound argument. however, for requiring all consumers to choose

from a diminished selection of stores.
The argument is not sound because stores are free to consolidate
and achieve scale economies on their own. If they think the lower

prices from larger scale operations will more than offset the loss of consumers' choices in store locations, they will consolidate. In just the
same way. the developer of an original set of screen displays can "consolidate" by keeping prices low initially to attract a large number of initial buyers.
Indeed, many new entrants to the software market do just that:
they charge a discounted initial price, with price increases phased in as
the product's market (and its value to users) grows. In economic terms,
the originator of the screen displays can capture the benefits that come
from economies of scale. By capturing them, the originator internalizes
them, and they are no longer "externalities" and no longer justify a
subsidized lower price to consumers. 39
A final way to look at the compatibility issue is to note that if compatibility were a good justification, it should apply in the trademark
context as well: a company could argue that it needed its new trademark to be "compatible" with another company's existing trademark, so
that the new company could take advantage of all the advertising that
the original company had done.
It would certainly make it easier for a small start-up company to
39. Menell himself oontradi.cta the notion that any "externalities" are pnsent in the
sc:reen display market. He note. that "Computer-u.er interface. [a broad phrase that in.
cludes sc:reen displaYI] generate network externalities to the extent that l tandardization
producetl larger networb and redUcetl retraining and mobility castl." Menell, supra note
1, at 1095. But paradoxically he also obMrves that '"!'he owner of a de facto industry standard could reap the value consumers place on l tandardiz.ation through monopoly pricing."
Id. at 1094. But if the owner of the lk facto ltandard can capture the value of I tandardiUltion, where '- the "externality?"
The fallacy in Menell'l arrument is that screen displays are not like telephone net·
work externalities: existing telephone u.en receive growing benefitl as new users join
the network. Existing.creen display u.ers do not receive growing benefits Il$ others also
begin using the urne screen displaya; rather they are attracted. to make their initial
purdlax because of the larJe number of other existing users. Because the "external benefitl" are known at the time of purchase, both buyer and seller can take them Into account through the price mechanism and thus they are not "external" at all.

384

COMPUTER/ LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

compete in the oil business if it could call its gasoline "Exxon ." Because
the same advertising would apply to both the original Exxon and the
copier, and hence would be spread out over a larger base of goods and
services, the cost of advertising would fall. Consumers would also be
spared the cost of investigating the quality of the competing Exxon
company because they would already be familiar with the Exxon
trademark.
The absurdity of these arguments-which are paraphrases of the
arguments made to allow screen displays to be copied-show why the
laller arguments are not persuasive: both trademark and copyright law
are designed to prevent this sort of free riding on the success of others.

B. Standarization Is Not W ell Suited To Judicial or Congressional
Decision
Merely reducing training time or increasing economies of scale,
then, like any bald assertion of cost savings, is not a sufficient justifica.
tion for allowing screen displays to be copied at will . Nevertheless, one
has a sense that standards are important; perhaps at some point, the
cost savings from standardization might become so large as to overcome
the loss in originators' incentives to create new screen display expres·
sions in the first place.

That point is absolutely correct, but it in no sense justifies the de·
nial of copyright for computer screen displays. The important questions
about standardization are not the abstract ones of standardization's desirability, but rather: who should decide when standards are finally de·
sirable, and how should they decide it? These are questions that
neither Congress nor the courts are well placed to determine. They in·
volve costs and benefits and the desires of computer users, and are thus
best suited to a determination in the marketplace, by the aggregate
purchasing decisions of thousands of individual buyers.
Happily, software publishers themselves have every incentive to
reach the socially optimal decision about standardization, as long as
they possess well defined and enforceable property rights in screen dis·
plays. At first blush, strong property rights in screen displays appear to
be consistent with the policy of incentives for research, but inconsistent
with the policy of compatibility through widely·adopted standards. In
fact they are consistent with both policies for this reason: strong property rights enable widespread licensing of display technologies.
How does this work? A company that sees t he value for users of a
standard screen display, like that for Lotus 1.2.3, can approach Lotlll
and offer a royalty payment in exchange for the righ t to use the Lot lll
display. For Lotus, this is money in the bank, earned at the very nomi·
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nal cost of negotiating a licensing agreement. Lotus therefore has a
strong incentive to reach agreement on such a license.
Of course, Lotus might decide that it could make more money by
selling its own software. worrying that a clone package would cut into
its markel. But two things prevent that outcome from being troublesome. First, any cut into Lotus's own market can be compensated for
by the royalty arrangement. The royalty payments need only be higher
than Lotus's net revenue loss to the clone market.
Second. if Lotus's calculations of an appropriate royalty amount
yield a figure that is higher than any cloning company is willing to pay,
then a license agreement will not be reached-but in this situation, it
should not be reached because the public is better off with only Lotus
selling the 1·2-3 screen display: Lotus can make more money from being the exclusive seller of the 1-2-3 display only if the public prefers
buying the original 1-2-3 from Lotus to buying the same display from a
clone maker.
If the public does prefer buying from Lotus itself, that fact strongly
suggests that the Lotus screen display may function as more than a display-it could be a h-ademark.40 Trademark significance means that
the public expects a consistent level of quality from the product. In
that case, Lotus could not license its screen display to others without
taking steps to guarantee to the buying public the same level of quality,
including technical support, from the licensee that Lotus provides its
own customers:u This guarantee would be impossible for Lotus to
make on behalf of a clone company that wrote its own programming
code and provided its own technical support. In that event, Lotus
should not license its screen display-nor should a court or Congress
compel it to do so.
In practice, as long as the screen display does not have trademark
significance, it is likely that Lotus can make more money by licensing,
because clone software constitutes a distinct market with distinct pricing. Users who prefer to buy clone software are those who are unable
to pay the high price that market-leading software commands, but who
are willing to pay a lower price for a product with less technical support
and lower assurances of quality. Lotus itself would have difficulty setoW. 5« gennullJl Rudnick, Window Iftusing; 1'radnnark Protection for CornpufC
DirpUlJl' and Sciftwo.l"t, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 382 (1990) (discU5$ing trademarks o n
"operating system" IOftWIU"I!!) .
41. See Transgo, Inc. v. A;ac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017, cert. fh·
"W, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986): Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank, 696 F.2d
1371, 1377, cert. dniW, SouthTrult Bank of Alabama v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 464 U.S. 826
(1982); Reddy Com., Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 944 (1979).
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ling separate prices for these separate markets,42 but by licensing clone
vendors, it can achieve the effect of separate pricing.
The fact that Lotus and other software producers have chosen to
sue clone makers. not license them, does not contradict this analysis.
For one thing, the clone makers may not have approached Lotus initially. For another, it is possible that for some software, market seg-

mentation is not helpful because the public greatly prefers buying
screen displays from the display's originator. Lotus is, after all, in the
best position to know whether licensing or not licensing is more profitable. Remember that if licensing is not more profitable, that fact is a signal to Lotus that the public puts a greater value on buying the original
than on buying a clone. In that case, a license should not be granted
and Lotus itself should be the exclusive seller of the 1-2-3 screen
display.
Finally, Lotus may be wrong in this particular instance and actually
be making less money than it might make by licensing. But that does
not mean that the copyright law should be changed so that screen displays are uncopyrightable. It means rather that companies, like all of
us, sometimes make mistakes. Even if this particular instance is a mistake, eventually companies like Lotus will figure out the cost effective
thing to do and do it. Allowing copyright to apply to computer displays
is essential for this beneficial long·run result to obtain.
Eliminating the copyright on screen displays on grounds of "com·
patibility" is therefore a red. herring. The compatibility of application
programs with operating environments is wholly encouraged by the de.
veloper of the environment; the use of add·ins to "standard" programs
is not an infringement; the use of another company's "standard" data
file format is not an infringement.
Selling a copied display to be used instead of a widely·used original
display is infringement. If the public would truly benefit from cloned
software packages that run "instead of" the original. then it will be in
the originating company's best interests to reach a licensing and royalty
agreement with the clone makers. If the public values screen displays
more highly when they come from the originating company, then the
originator will not license the display-nor should it. In no event does
the public benefit from having weakened. vague, or non-existent copyright protection for computer screen displays.
V.

SLQW·THE·PROGft.ESS.OF-5CREEN DISPLAY·DESIGN ARGUMENT

The argument is sometimes made that software companies, fearing
liability, will not bother to develop improvements to others' screen dis42. It would have difficult !letting dhpuate prices because buyers in the cheaper mar·
ket could turn around and re-eell to the higher priced market.
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play designs. "[I]f companies are afraid to go to market with what they
think are incremental, but distinct, improvements on 8 basic design. we
will become a stagnant industry bounded by the usual and comfortable,""s The point made here, and echoed by others," is that technology
improves in incremental steps. not all of which are likely to emerge
from the same company. With strong copyright protection on displays,
the argument goes, non-originating companies will be reluctant to invest in these step--by-step improvements becaUse they will face copyright liability for using them.
Once again, this argument misses the mark entirely. Suppose the
Acme company creates a better design for the Macintosh in the form of
an incremental improvement. Assume that copyright law prevents
Acme from selling the Macintosh screen display with their improvements because too much of the protected Macintosh display must be
copied to allow the improvements to operate.
Is this bad? Certainly Dot: if small, "incremental" changes were
enough to allow 8 company to copy another company's entire screen display without paying royalties, then every software developer in the land
would make trivial changes to popular displays and begin to clone prod.

ucts. The disincentive to originating software companies to invest in the
development of screen display would be immense. They simply would
not do it.
Is the public hurt, then, if developers' fear of lawsuits prevents
them from selling screen displays with incremental changes? Not at all.
Once again, if there is value in an improved screen display for the Macintosh, the public will be willing to pay for it (that is how we know it
has value). If the public is willing to pay for it, then Acme can obtain a
license from Apple and pay for the license with the profits from sales to
a willing public.
I! Apple will not license the Macintosh display to Acme, then Acme
can license its incremental improvements to Apple. I! there is a public
demand for these improvements, there is nothing to prevent Apple and
Acme from getting together and agreeing on a royalty arrangement one
way or the other.
Of course, if screen displays were not copyrightable in the first
place, then neither an original display nor incremental improvements
by other developers would be protected, so that no one would have an
incentive to create anything, whether fundamental or incremental.
That would benefit neither originating companies, companies making
improvements, nor the public.
43. WUlt.ana, A Thn!Ut to FuNre Sqjhoore, BYTE, Jan. 1986, at 6.
44. $ft, e.g., Samuebon, nlpn.! note 3; Note, (;qpvright Protection for Computer
.sc.-n DUplllY6, 72 MINN. 1.. REv. 1123, 1153 (1988).
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ScREEN DISPLAYS ARE FUNCTIONAL. NOT ARTISTIC

Lawyers writing on copyright law often raise the objection, more
sophisticated than the previous objections, that computer program

screen displays are functional or "utilitarian" and hence that they
should not receive the same protection that, say. a painting or novel or
movie would receive.4& A variation on this argument is the assertion
that displays are appropriate for patent protection, which is designed
for technology, but not for copyright protection, which is designed for
artistic expression.-t8
These, too, are pointless arguments. Copyright protection has long
been applied to functional or utilitarian works, and there is no reason to
discontinue this satisfactory practice. Second, the reasons that copyright and patent protection differ have little to do with the differences
between art and technology, but a lot to do with the differences between intangible information and tangible things. On either ground,
screen displays fall clearly into the copyright category.
Most copyrightable things are utilitarian and receive protection
without the slightest quibble: maps, car repair books, commercials and
advertisements. encyclopedias, dictionaries. cook books. instruction
manuals-all these are utilitarian, yet copyrightable. No one seriously
argues that these things, long the subject of copyright. should be denied
copyright's simple and effective form of protection."?
Nor is the application of copyright to functional works a recent
turn of events. When members of the Constitutional Convention were
writing the Constitution, with its copyright and patent clauses. nearly
all printed materials that originated in the United States were functional in the sense of conveying factual data, not artistic or literary ex·
pression.a American arts and letters were undeveloped; American
~. &e Samuebon,.rupro note 3~ Stem,.rupro note I , at 311 (expressing concem that
''utilitarian aspects" of screen dUlpla~ mtght be protected); Fonten, It Wal," ana Tal'"
LiM M¥ Duck, So How CorM It. Not In/ri~t?: 11u! Que Agoinllt ''LoowM-Feel''
Protection /01' Computer Progrn'fM, 70 JF>TOS 639, 662 (1988) (utilitarian argument implicit in dbcussian of progl'llDa as "technological goo<k").
46. &e Samuelson, .rupro note 3.
47. To be lure, the Supreme Court'l decision bt FNt hblwtioJU, Inc. v. Ruml Te~
~ Senrict' Ca, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) eliminated copyright protection for telephone
boob and by implication for any utilitarian work created by labor and effort without origlnality of expreuion. Neverthelesa, courts have not extended FeUt beyond utilitarian
worb whose arrangement is predetermined and thus for which the creator has essentially no scope for originality whatever. 5«, e.g., Kreg<lll v. Aaociated Press, 937 F.2d 700
(2d Cir. 1991); Bellsouth Advertlsing &. Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information Publishing Co., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); and the discussion of these cases in Gm.burg, No
"Sweut"? Copyright and Other Protecrnm qf WOTkI qf Il'\fornwtkm qJttT Feist v. Rural
Telephone, 92 CoLUM.. L. REv. 338, 347, 352 (1992).
48. Set Gm.burg, A 10k qf Two CopIIright3: Litemrv ProptTtjJ in RevolutWnal1l
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novels barely ex.iste<! j 49 poetry, painting, sculpture, drame all these
must have been far less significant to American culture than they are
now.
To be sure, works of art, music, and literature were appreciated and
imported from abroad. And just as surely, the writers of the Constitution could look forward to an American presence in the art world and
could wisely provide for its later emergence. But in the late 18th century, American publishers already put out utilitarian works in
abundance.1IO

It would have been perverse indeed for the Founders to write a
Constitutional provision that was intended to exclude the very functional works that made up the bulk of American intellectual property
output, yet was intended to apply to artistic works. works that at the
time made up an insignificant fraction of that Qutput.ln
The first Copyright statute, enacted just one year after the ConstiInmce and AI'MTica, 64 'I'ULANE 1.. REv., 991, lQ02...()5 (1990), Ginsbura notes that the l.te
18th century record of copyright deposita featured an overwhelming preponderance of
"instructive, clvlcs-orlented workl" web u newspapers, and tItlN In poUt1eaI. science, tu.tory, and social .cIence. Iii at 1002. r- than ten pen:ent of the fint deaode', copyright
deposiu were for novelL Iii (calculated). More pointedly me ob.ervet that "copyright
was sought for the socially ta4u~ tMtructhle worb that Congreu had Intended to en·
courage." Iii at 1003 (emphull added). Th_ worb were primarily textboob. Iii Even
two of the earUNt litigated copyright cues dealt with functional worD: a PHARMAcoPOEIA OF THE UNITED SrATD; OF AMERICA. and records of Supreme Court opln1om. Iii at
1005.

49. Although which work should be oontidered. the "first Ameriean novel" is a matter
for d.bipute, • prime contender for that title is William Hill Brown's THE PoWER OF SYMPATHY, published in 1789. See P. PARKER, EARLy AMERICAN FicnON :xW, xv (1984). One
literary historlan summed up scholarly atUtudel toward American literature of the late
18th and early 1!Jth centuriel tlu. way:
The country was too yoUll8 to have a literature of iU own. Ita lnhabltanu were
too much preoc:c:upled with qUestiON of lurvival or with ambitious political careen or with trying to get rich quicldy to write thelIl$t!JveI or to IUpport the ef·
forti of the few that wrote. They had no atandarcb and no ability to recognize
good writing, not did they undentand the value of a nationalllterature.
H . PEITER, THE EARLy AMERICAN NOVEL 11 (1971).
The author of thiI observation notes that many critics have objected to thiI dismaJ.
cbanw:terizatlon of American letten at the turn of the 18th century, but that these objectiON themHlves "tended . .. to confirm the majority view [ntherJ than to constitute con_
vincing counterargwnents." Iii
One English commentator of 1820, Sidney Smith, asked _thingly "In the four
quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an American play?" 33
EDINBURGH REv. 79 (1820), quot«i in H. PETrER., .upM at 4-5. This Indictment became
famoU& enough that the Supreme Court quoted It almost a hundred yean later in United
l>ictWtKlr., Co. v. G. &- o. M~m Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908).
50. See Glmburg,.upM note 48, at 1002-04.
51. Foreign literature, principally English, did exist in the United States but Willi denied cop)lriiht protection for over a century after the lint U.s. cop)'riiht enactment. until
the International Cop)lriiht Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106.
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tution,52 confirms that this perverse interpretation was not intended.
The 1790 Act applied. only to maps, charts, and books.53 Two-thirds of
the statute's subject matter-maps and charts-was explicitly utilita·
rian; the remaining one-third-books-was neither utilitarian nor artistic on its face. but as the preceding discussion shows. was markedly
utilitarian in practice at the time. two Strikingly, much notable artistic
output of the late Eighteenth century-music, painting, and drama--was not explicitly protected by the first copyright law.s:!
The history of the American copyright system, then, flatly contra·
diets arguments that copyright should apply to artistic, not functional,
works. If anything, copyright was designed more for the latter than for
the former.

A

Copyrights Versus Patents

History is thus on the side of copyright for functional. utilitarian
works. Yet, a question remains as to how to reconcile copyright protec-

tion for utilitarian works with patent protection on what appears to be
the same type of works. Should these two very different forms of protection ~xist in the same work?
The answer is that they do not. We often think of copyright as applying to "art," and patents to "technology," but this view is misleading.
Patent protection is primarily applicable to tangible things.56 Copyright
applies primarily (though certainly not exclusively) to ·'works"-intan·
gible things that do not depend on any particular tangible medium of
expression.
This distinction makes sense: in general. "works" are a form of information. Information has always been faster and cheaper to copy and
use, and therefore requires a faster and cheaper means of legal protection than, say, tangible personal property. Copying, i.e., manufacturing.
an invention is usually costlier and more difficult than copying books or
maps. Modest inventions can be left unprotected. by patent law because
copying will be discouraged by the costs of a copier's going into the
52. Act of May 31. 1190, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
53. fa.
5.(. See Text accompanying note 48.
55. Musical compositions were not added until 1831 (Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 Stat.
436). Paintings and drawings were expressly included in copyright's subject matter only
in 1870 (see Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198), having been ~ as explicit copyright subject matter by Cortgre$$ when earlier pro~ in 1824. See S. 77, 18th CoIl(., bt
Sess. (1824).
56. Of course, patent law applies to processes .. well .. tangible machines, articles of
manufacture, and compositions of matter. ProceueJ are intangible. But the value of a
Procell!!l lies in its use. and the use of a procesJ always entails lOme mechanical or chemical
or other tangible thing.
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manufacturing business.s')' Bigger (and more profitable) advances in
technology will justify a major expense by the would-be copier, and accordingly are prevented by a more extensive. and costlier, form of protection-patents.
The better way to look at the "art vs. technology" distinction is
therefore to see that it is, broadly speaking, a distinction between those
things that take the form of intangible works of information-relatively
cheap to copy-and those that take the form. of tangible objects-relatively expensive to copy.
The very sluggish pace of the patenting process also argues against
patents for screen displays. Most software, whether computer programs, or screen displays, or entire user-computer interfaces, has 8 ~
luI life measured in years, not decades or lifetimes. This observation
seems to cut against copyright protection because of copyright's "life of
the author plus fifty years" duration. But the long tail of copyright protection has essentially no effect either wayan works with short life
spans like screen displays, so it is irrelevant to the issues. If a screen
display is still protected twenty-five or thirty years after everyone has
stopped using it, then who cares if it is still in copyright?
What is relevant and what we should care about is the amount of
time it takes to get protection in the first place. With copyright, that
time is negligible. With patent law, it is substantial. The average time
to get a patent in the United States today is above two years. Worse,
the average is not indicative of the possible upper limits. Recently, an
inventor received a patent on a semiconductor computer chip after a
twenty year application process!58
U screen displays are to be protected by patent law, what is a
would-be competitor/copier of displays supposed to do: gamble that a
patent will not be issued on the original displays and bring out a copied
display, running the risk that if a patent is in fact issued, all investments in production and marketing will be lost? Or wait to see whether
a patent will be issued or not, which in practice means waiting at least
two to three years qfter the time when it becomes apparent that an
originating company's displays are popular and approaching the status
of a standard? Neither course of action is attractive or practical precisely because computer technology and consequently screen displays
are rapidly changing.
Seen in this light, computer screen displays fall plainly on the side
57. Patent law accompliahetl thia through the "nonobviOU$" requirement. earlier cut
in the form of the "invention" or "flash of genius" requirement. 5ft 35 U.s.C. § 103, dz...
~ in Graham v. J ohn Deen! Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
~.

~

tory, N.Y.

Pollack , Compon)l Newa.· A Chip Patent /, Granted That Mall Rewrite Hz...

nMES. Aug. 30, 1990, at Dl.

392

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

of informational works and copyright protection: they can relatively
cheaply be duplicated like almost any computer software,59 and they
change rapidly and so need a means for quickly-acquired protection.
Applying the costly and time-consuming patent law system to these

technologies makes little sense.
VII.

DIFFERENCE IN SCOPE OF PROTECTION

To say that copyright applies to functional works is not to say, of
course, that courts ought to be indifferent to differences in degrees of
functionality. They ought not and are not: the scope of copyright pro-tection that courts give to a given work depends on the extent to which
the work is artistic or utilitarian. More artistic works customarily get
greater protection; more utilitarian ones get less.60 But this is not because of some prejudice in favor of the fine arts and against information
technology; rather it is because functional works offer less room for individual variations in expression than artistic works.
A cook book is more constrained in its expression than a novel because a cook book mU3t convey certain information; a novel's author has
a wider scope for expression of plot and character. A map is more constrained in what it shows than a work of abstract art. A blueprint has
less room for authorial interpretation than a sketch of an imaginary
building's exterior. Because copyright protects expression, the greater
an author's contribution to expression, the more extensive the copyright protection accorded it.
These observations about constraints on expression in utilitarian
works are a far cry from saying that utilitarian works either do not receive or should not receive copyright protection at all. They do and
they should, to the extent that they are works of information and depend for incentives to their creation on a relatively cheap and easy
means of protection. Computer displays are no more nor less utilitarian
or functional than maps, charts, cookbooks, or blueprints; like them,
displays are easily duplicated works of information; and there is accordingly every reason to include screen displays within the bounds of the
subject matter of copyright.
59. Software utilities are widely avallable that take "snapshots" of a computer screen,
and then produce the programming code necessary to recreate that screen snapshot

afmh.
60. See 2 P. GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT § 8.4, at 97 & n.3 and accompanying text ("courts
generally protect minimally expressive fact worlu against only literal or dOlle to literal
appropriation .... [Clourts take generally the same approach to functional works").
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A. Issue 3: Can a particular screen display be copyrighted? (the testoj-protection question)
The third major issue arising from copyright protection on computer screen displays is not the legal one of copyrightable subject m.atter, nor the policy question of whether screen displays ought to fall
within copyright's subject matter, but the more factual one of whether a
particular display meets the copyright tests of originality and fixation.
Fixation is never a problem with commercial software. By definition, if a screen display is sold in the marketplace it must be fixed in
the form of program code, if not in the form of drawings or video-taped
images. Indeed, the Copyright Office only requires a deposit and regist ration for program code, and the Office will use that registration to
cover the visual displays of the software as well. 61
The more significant question is whether a given display is sufficiently original to sustain copyright protection. The answer to that
question turns on several factual inquiries, including the complexity of
the screen designs; the degree of originality of screen designs; the fact
that ideas do not get protection; and the extent to which the screen design is dictated by functional considerations.
The complexity of the screen. A screen with nothing but a handful
of words on it will not be copyrightable, just as short phrases or titles
are not copyrightable in general. The addition of graphic artwork to
text helps avoid the problem of too-trivial a design and is a factor in
copyrightability, but is not dispositive. Fears that simple textual lists
will be copyrightable in a computer screen display are unfounded; ordinary copyright principles of originality will prevent that result, without
need for the removal of screen displays from copyrightable subject

matter.
In short, even though "screen displays" in general are copyrightable subject matter, a particular display may be so simple that it will
fail to receive protection.62
61. "The Copyright Office has consistently held the view that a single registration is
sufficient to protect the copyright in a computer program, including related screen displays, without a separate registration for screen displays or reference to the displays in
the 'nature of authorship' description on the application. An application may give a general description such as 'entire work' or 'computer program'. This description would
cover any copyrightable authorship contained in the computer program and screen displays, regardless of whether identifying material for the screens is deposited. . . . [I]n
June 1988 the office announced a decision to require that all copyrightable expression embodied in a computer program owned by the same claimant, including computer screen
displays, be registered on a single application form." Registration Policies for Screen Displays Clarified (opinion letter, August 25, 1989, and copyright office screen display leaflet), [1989] Copyright L . Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,559, at 11,491 (display leaflet).
62. "[C]opyright cannot be secured for names, titles, and phrases such as column
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The degree of originality. Graphic "icons" such as trash cans
should receive exactly the same protection they get when reproduced in
pen-and-ink drawings: if the art work is original, it is protected. Square
boxes into which users insert check marks on-screen will get no protection because square boxes have long existed on paper and there is nothing original about them.
Naturally there will be a wide range of in-between cases, but the
point is that drawings and text on a computer screen are drawings and
text. There is simply no reasoned argument that a drawing or body of
text on a screen differs in originality, and hence in copyright consequences, from the same thing on a piece of paper.
The fact that ideas do not get protection. The copyright distinction
between idea and expression is too well known to bear extended discussion here. 63 Suffice to say that copyright applies only to the expression
of ideas, not to the ideas themselves. An "idea" is something one can
talk about and understand, but that still has a wide array of possible
embodiments. One can speak of "a painting of a vase of flowers," for
example, without conveying anything about what a particular painting
of a vase of flowers looks like. Obviously, the "idea" of painting such a
picture cannot be copyrighted, though particular paintings can be.
In just that same way, one can speak of a screen display that uses
"icons, windows, animation, sound, and menus," without conveying anything about what such a display actually looks like. All these concepts
are "ideas" because a variety of means of expressing them are available.
Nearly all the features of programs that people like to talk about are
liked or talked about at the level of ideas and for that reason cannot be
protected by copyright. In addition to the obvious "ideas" like icons (including the idea of "three-dimensional"icons), windows, etc., other noncopyrightable ideas include "moving bar" menus as used by Lotus 1-2-3;
pop-up (or down) menus; a "rubber-band box" for indicating a variable
sized area on the screen; "tear-off" menus that remain on-screen and
can be moved around; menus that pop-up at the location of the mouse
cursor instead of at a fixed location; RAM-resident programs that overlay the current screen; and hundreds more.
As long as talking about these concepts does not determine the way
headings, simple checklists, and the like, nor can it be secured for the format, arrangement, or typography of a blank form or similar work. Thus, in general, menu screens and
similar functional interfaces consisting of words or brief phrases in a particular format are
not registrable." Registration Policies for Screen Displays Clarified (opinion letter, August 25, 1989, and copyright office screen display leaflet), [1989] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 20,559, at 11,490 (opinion letter).
63. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F .2d 485 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See generally 1 P . GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.2.2.4
at 16 (1989).
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they actually look on the screen, they are "ideas" and cannot be protected. 64 Nothing in the above discussion, for example, describes the
way that the listed concepts appear on the screen; that means they are
indeed "ideas" that can freely be used by others.
The extent to which the screen layout is dictated by functional con·
siderations. To the extent that such concepts do sometimes dictate appearance when implemented on a computer screen, however, they
cannot be protected by copyright. This result follows from the Baker v.
Selden 65 case of over a hundred years ago. Baker said that the forms
used in a double entry accounting system were dictated by the double
entry method of accounting itself, and hence that the forms could not
receive copyright protection. The case stands for the broader proposition that whenever the expression of an otherwise copyrightable work
is dictated by its function, the work cannot receive copyright protection.
Baker means today that if a given feature of a screen display is dictated by functional requirements, it cannot be copyrighted. Suppose
that human factors research were to show, for example, that the easiest
command menus to understand are horizontal, appear across the top of
the screen, begin with capital letters, and contain no more than five
terms at a time. If that were a demonstrated research result, no one
could copyright a menu insofar as it fit that description because the expression-horizontal menus, five terms, etc.-would be dictated by the
functional requirement of ease of understanding. And when expression
is dictated by functional requirements, the Baker v. Selden "merger"66
doctrine prevents the application of copyright.
When screen designs are not dictated by functional considerations,
that means there are a variety of designs to accomplish any given set of
functions. When there are a variety of designs, that means any of them
can be original and hence copyrightable.
Most, if not all, of the benefits of new ideas in screen display de64. Indeed, articles in the trade press that are comprehensible without the addition of
accompanying screen display illustrations are almost necessarily confined to a discussion
of uncopyrightable ideas, not expression.
65. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
66. "Merger" refers to the fact that when an uncopyrightable "idea" is inextricably
bound up with, i.e., "merged" with, the "expression" of that idea, the expression cannot be
copyrighted. To allow a copyright in that situation would provide a monopoly on the un·
derlying idea, a protection for which the costs would exceed the benefits. For illustrations
of this principle, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967); Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 109-110
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). A similar idea is that standard literary devices (scenes a faire) cannot be
protected by copyright. See See v. Durang, 711 F .2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980).
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sign, in other words, will be freely available to all who will take the
time to design their particular appearance with some originality. Here
again, routine application of the traditional copyright requirement of
originality to screen displays ensures that this is so.

B.

Issue 4: Is a particular screen display infringed by another
particular screen display? (the infringement question)

The only really difficult issue for litigation, after the questions of
subject matter and originality have been answered, is whether a given
screen display is infringed by another. This question has to be answered by comparing the two displays side by side. Unlike the question
of copyright's subject matter, about which the legislative history has a
lot to say, the question of infringement is not worth discussing in an essay like this one precisely because it is fact dependant.
At best one can say, as noted earlier,67 that because they are functional, screen displays will not get as broad a scope of protection as
works of fine art. But at bottom, one must conclude that like all questions of infringement, the judgements called for in cases of screen display infringement may be easy or difficult, but in no event can they be
made in the abstract, by talking about the copyrightability of "screen
displays" in the subject matter sense.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Courts and commentators facing the question of copyright protection for computer screen displays have too often failed to distinguish
copyright policy from copyright law. They have further failed to distinguish among the three essential questions inherent in any copyright litigation: what is the scope of copyright's subject matter; are the
copyright tests of originality and fixation satisfied in the given case; and
does the defendant's use of computer screen displays infringe the plaintiff's copyright rights.
Copyright policy only comes into play when the Copyright Act is
not clear. The only possible statutory uncertainty regarding screen displays would concern their inclusion within copyright's subject matter:
are they "works of authorship?" But even here there is no uncertainty:
despite their relatively new technology, they fit very comfortably into
the existing categories of copyrightable works, either as literary works
(for primarily textual screen displays), or as pictorial works (for primarily graphic screens), or as audio-visual works (for sequences of
graphical images).
Moreover, Congress intended that each new technological medium
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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not require the courts to ure-invent the copyright wheel" by making determinations of copyrightability on a clean slate. Rather, Congress intended that copyright be applied to "works," not to particular media;
hence each new medium that technology creates need not cause a judicial search for Congressional intent or underlying policy, but merely a
determination whether some type of otherwise copyrightable work can
be embodied in the new medium.
Even if a policy analysis were called for, that analysis would plainly
show that screen displays belong within copyright's protection. The
need to encourage investment in screen displays dictates some form of
protection, but that protection will not be to the detriment of the public
and its need for standardization. The ready availability of licensing for
displays with royalty payments to the originator allows the public to obtain all the benefits of standardization, minimization of training costs,
and familiarity, without subtracting from developers' incentives for
creation.
A policy analysis is therefore not called for on the subject matter
question, nor is any other copyright question of law regarding displays
even remotely uncertain. The attempt by litigating parties, the encouragement of the attempt by commentators, and the acceptance of the attempt by courts, to raise fundamental policy issues regarding the scope
of copyright in screen displays has only encouraged wasteful litigation
on a matter that is about as certain as statute or policy can make it.
The only questions of interest regarding displays are the primarily
factual ones of originality and fixation-the latter hardly worth discussion because an unfixed display is not a practical possibility-and the
very factual question whether a defendant's display infringed the plaintiff's rights in its own display. These are questions that can be answered only in the context of a particular case, with a close examination
of particular screen displays.
If courts would keep these distinctions of copyright policy, law, subject matter, and tests in mind, we would have greater certainty in the
law, more productive investment in the development of improved
screen displays, wide-spread acceptance and use of screen display standards, and far less wasteful litigation.

